signiªcant resistance movement inside the country. Neither British nor American special operations forces were active in Austria until the late stages of the war, so there were few reliable sources of intelligence. British ofªcials knew little about Soviet plans and aspirations for postwar Europe, and there was no coordination with the Soviet government. British planning for Austria therefore had to take account of all possible scenarios at each stage. British ofªcials also had to coordinate their efforts with the United States. During an all-out war, when attention and resources were devoted to war-ªghting, national leaders were not apt to focus on tiny Austria. To complicate matters further, nobody could predict whether the occupation would begin before or after a cease-ªre, and it was not certain which Allied units would be the ªrst to enter Austria. Responsibility for planning an efªcient occupation kept shifting between the various military commands, and at certain points no one was actually overseeing the planning.
The ªnal part of Hills's book is devoted to the functioning of the Allied Commission in Vienna during its embryonic stages. A somewhat incongruous concluding chapter refers to both wartime and postwar issues. Despite troubles throughout the war, British occupation planning proved to be effective. Although the British military government was "too often indecisive, inefªcient, untimely and not totally effective" (p. 198), it somehow carried out its mission.
Hills acknowledges that the structure of her book is artiªcial, but she notes the difªculty of tracing the progress of occupation planning when the strategic military situation kept changing as Allied war-ªghting strategies succeeded or failed and responsibility for planning shifted frequently from one military theater to another. The complex interactions between the many civilian and military planning organizations also pose problems for historical analysis.
Partly for these reasons Hills opted for a thematic rather than chronological approach. This works in the sense that she is able to say what she wants in reasonably clear terms, at least when she conªnes her attention to the British internal bureaucracy. But this thematic structure also bombards the reader with a great deal of repetition and occasional contradictions.
The book has merit. It will be of assistance to those who study how governments during World War II structured their planning for postconºict operations and to those who are more interested in process than results. Regarding the other subjects covered, the book would have beneªted by at least mentioning the work of other scholars (including recent books and articles by Siegfried Beer, Günter Bischof, Eduard Staudinger, Alfred Ableitunger, Robert Keyserlingk, Anton Pelinka, Rolf Steininger, and Josef Leidenfrost; among others) and by considering the large volume of material that has become available since she completed her dissertation in 1975.
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